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Abstract
Firing the manager is a drastic measure employed by ﬁrms to deal with poor
performance. However, data on within-ﬁrm dynamics are scarce, and the ﬁr-
ing of individual managers is rarely recorded in the ﬁrm level data currently
available. This makes the value of ﬁring a manager diﬃcult to assess. Data on
sports oﬀer a unique opportunity to study this phenomenon because the ﬁring
of a coach is usually well-publicized. Using data on soccer, the author evalu-
ates the eﬀect of the ﬁring of a coach on team performance. As teams do not
face the same opponents before and after a coach is ﬁred, the issue of sample
selectivity is addressed.
Keywords: Poisson models, soccer, rating models
JEL: J44, L20, C230.
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1 Introduction
Managers are usually held accountable for the performance of the ﬁrm for which
they work. If the results fall short of expectations, they may be ﬁred or they may get
another perhaps less prestigious position in the same ﬁrm. For economists it is very
diﬃcult to assess whether this action by the board improves the proﬁtability (or
any other measure of performance) of the ﬁrm since these changes in management
are not usually observable from standard ﬁrm level data. Only changes in top-
level management are announced if the ﬁrm is required to do so because of the
ownership structure. In sports, however, data on the performance of teams and on
the dismissal of coaches is publicly available.
Using data on soccer, we examine whether ﬁring a coach leads to improvement
of the performance of the team. Folklore has it that replacement of a coach leads
to a ‘shock’-eﬀect; this improves the performance of a team.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of related studies.
Section 3 discusses data and presents some preliminary evidence which indicates
that ﬁring a coach improves performance. However, this preliminary evidence is
misleading as it does not account for diﬀerences in the order of play. That is, the
old and new coaches do not face the same opponents. Two statistical models that
control for this type of sample selectivity are ﬁtted later in the paper. They reveal
that ﬁring a coach in fact does not improve team performance.
2 Changing Managers and Coaches: Some Findings in the Liter-
ature
Textbook economic theory would suggest that a ﬁrm replaces a manager to increase
proﬁt (or reduce loss). If this is indeed the case, then proﬁts should increase after
a ﬁring decision. In theory, one could compare proﬁts under the old manager to
proﬁts under the new manager to see if performance has improved. However, there
are three diﬃculties with this seemingly straightforward approach.
The ﬁrst diﬃculty is the measurement of performance. In theory, proﬁt maxi-
mization may be the objective of a ﬁrm. In practice, however, the performance of
a ﬁrm is diﬃcult to measure, and in fact, diﬀerent managers in an organization
can pursue diﬀerent objectives. The intended eﬀect of ﬁring a manager may be
diﬀerent from increasing proﬁt. A manager may be ﬁred to appease shareholders
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or to demonstrate that the ﬁrm can be ‘tough’ on poor performance. The second
diﬃculty is observing if and when a manager is ﬁred. Firm level data disclosing
the duration of employment of individual employees are diﬃcult to ﬁnd. Firm level
data are usually in such aggregated form that it is not possible to observe the ﬁring
of an individual manager.
Even if the performance of a ﬁrm can be precisely deﬁned and measured and
the ﬁring of a manager is recorded, there remains a third diﬃculty. The old and the
new manager invariably face diﬀerent conditions. This makes it diﬃcult to assess
what part of the change in performance is due to the change of manager, and what
part is due to the change in the conditions faced by the two managers.
The issues mentioned above are addressed only partially in the literature on
changes in performance and its relationship to changes in management. There ex-
ist in fact two streams of the literature to which this paper is related: one in ﬁnance
and the other in the statistical analysis of sport outcomes. Most of the studies in
the ﬁnance literature on managerial change and performance focus on the reverse
question: what are the factors that lead to a change in management? For example, in
a study on the relation between a ﬁrm’s stock return and subsequent management
changes, Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s share performance and
the probability of a management change are negatively related. They also examine if
the announcement of a management change results in any abnormal stock returns,
but ﬁnd little evidence of this eﬀect. While Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) exam-
ine the eﬀect of the announcement of a new manager, they do not examine whether
the performance of stock returns actually improve under the new manager.
The latter issue is addressed in papers by Denis and Denis (1995) and more
recently by Khurana and Nohria (2000). Using the ratio of operating income before
depreciation to operating assets as the measure of performance, Denis and Denis
ﬁnd ‘that forced resignations of top managers are preceded by large and signiﬁcant
declines in operating performance and followed by large improvements in perfor-
mance.’ They conclude that there are valuable operating improvements associated
with forced resignations. Khurana and Nohria use a similar measure of ﬁrm per-
formance to assess whether forced management turnover leads to improvements
of performance. They propose a model in which the departure of the existing man-
ager and the origin of the incoming manager are analyzed simultaneously. Using
a random-eﬀects panel data approach to model ﬁrm performance, they ﬁnd that
natural management turnover followed by an insider has little eﬀect on ﬁrm per-
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formance, but that forced turnover followed by an outside successor improves the
performance signiﬁcantly.
The studies just discussed use ﬁnancial measures of performance to assess the
performance of a ﬁrm. For sport teams in general and soccer teams in particular,
ﬁnancial measures of success are less relevant. Only few soccer teams are listed
as publicly traded ﬁrms on stock exchanges. The aims of a team are usually more
clear than the goals of a ﬁrm: teams want to end a competition as highly ranked as
possible.
The coach of a team has an important role in determining the ranking of team as
he trains the team and determines the line-up. Moreover, he is one of the managers
of the club who has an important task in determining which player is hired and
which player is put on the transfer list. A coach’s responsibilities are to provide
training and guidance to players which translates into more wins and a higher
ranking in the league.
There is a number of reasons why a coach may be ﬁred. The reason cited most
often is the existence of a ‘shock’-eﬀect: the new coach is able to motivate the
players better, and therefore is able to improve results. Coaches work under high
media and fan pressure. If results fall short of expectations, or if the quality of the
play does not live up to expectations, pressure may mount to ﬁre the coach. The
general public is willing to pay to see winners, less so to see losers. Moreover, it is
important for teams to be successful, because transfers of players from successful
teams to other teams are more valuable, and hence the return on investments into
these players is higher.
The eﬀect of changing a coach has been studied before, see for instance Van Da-
len (1994), Scully (1995), and Brown (1982). Van Dalen’s paper discusses whether
ﬁring the coach of a soccer team improves performance. He estimates a model in
which the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between the goals scored by the two
teams which play each other in a particular game. The independent variables are
a measure of the quality of the referee, a measure that captures the diﬀerence in
team quality, a dummy variable indicating a home game, the result of the previous
game, and a trend. He estimates this model for each team in the competition, and
he extends the model with a dummy variable which indicates that the new coach
has taken over. Using data for the 1993/94 season only, he ﬁnds that all coach
changes have a positive eﬀect on the goal diﬀerence, and the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly
positive in three of the ﬁve cases.
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The study of Van Dalen has two drawbacks. The most important drawback is
that the model used for the goal diﬀerence depends on the ranking of both teams
at the moment the game is played. As we will argue later, this may bias the results
because of the non-random order of play. Another drawback of the approach of Van
Dalen is that he uses data for one season only. By extending the sample period to
more seasons we can assess whether a ﬁring eﬀect, if any, is similar across seasons
or not.
Another contribution from the sports literature is Scully (1995). In chapter 8,
he examines changes of coaches in baseball and basketball between consecutive
seasons. In his empirical analysis, Scully estimates binary choice models where the
decision whether or not to terminate the contract of the coach is the dependent
variable, and the ranking at the end of the season is the (only) independent variable.
He ﬁnds that the probability that a contract is terminated is signiﬁcantly positively
related to the ranking for almost all teams in baseball and basketball. On average,
a one-rank increase in club standing increases the average probability of ﬁring by
0.066% and 0.077% percent in baseball (National League and American League re-
spectively) and by 0.11% in basketball. He then proceeds to regress the change in
ranking between two seasons on the status of the coach. He ﬁnds that in almost all
cases the decision to ﬁre the coach was rational, with the average improvement in
ranking being approximately 1 in baseball and 2/3 in basketball.
Scully analyzes the termination of the contract of a coach between seasons. This
makes his approach less relevant for soccer, as the composition of teams in soccer
usually changes signiﬁcantly between seasons. Moreover, in soccer, coaches are
ﬁred both during the season and between seasons.
In contrast to Scully, in this paper we restrict attention to coach changes during
the season. By focusing on coach changes during the season we can measure the
coach-eﬀect better, since the pool of players that new coach can use is not very
diﬀerent from the one the old coach faced.
Brown (1982) also analyzes coach changes during seasons and uses data from
the National Football League (NFL) over the 1970-1978 period. He estimates a ran-
dom eﬀect panel data model in which performance (the percentage of wins) is
explained by lagged performance, a succession dummy, and a (random) individual
eﬀect. He ﬁnds that a change of coach in the current season costs 11% in the per-
centage of games won. Since a season consists of 14 games, this means that it costs
a little bit more than one game won during the season. Because it is diﬃcult to hire
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Number of APG N¯ M¯
coaches ﬁred old new old new old new
1993/94 4 0.50 1.30 0.90 1.28 2.26 1.61
1994/95 7 1.01 1.26 1.31 1.68 1.84 1.88
1995/96 8 0.98 1.04 1.43 1.10 1.91 1.80
1996/97 4 1.03 1.43 1.19 1.36 1.70 1.39
1997/98 5 0.66 1.08 1.26 1.46 2.26 1.48
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
new players during the season, he interprets this ﬁnding as ritual scapegoating by
the board of a team, necessary to appease fans and press media.
3 Data and Descriptive Measures
We use data on the soccer teams that make up the Dutch premier league (the high-
est division in The Netherlands) for the ﬁve seasons between 1993/94 and 1997/98.
The unit of observation is a game. The date when each game is played and the ﬁ-
nal score are recorded. If a coach was ﬁred during a season, the date of ﬁring is
recorded as well. A detailed listing of all coach changes within these seasons is
given in Appendix A.
In this paper, we focus on the results on the ﬁeld as a measurement of team
performance. We assume that the board of soccer teams want their team to be
as high as possible in the ranking. Dutch soccer teams are usually foundations
without a proﬁt objective, and there are no franchises that can be traded. The
teams are managed by a board, and the board appoints a coach. Considering the
recent commercialization of soccer, one may wonder whether a high ranking in the
league is the only aim of the board of a soccer team. For instance, the board may
want to maximize shareholder value instead of the results on the ﬁeld. Since no
Dutch teams were listed on the stock exchange during the period considered, this
issue is not addressed in this paper.
We focus on the 18 teams in the Dutch premier league. We restrict ourselves
to coach changes that are not caused by outside oﬀers to the coach. Instead, we
focus on changes that are initiated by the management of the club because these
changes are initiated to improve performance. At ﬁrst glance, this may appear to
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introduce sample selection because it is known from the labor market literature
that an employee who anticipates being ﬁred may quit to avoid any stigma eﬀect of
a ﬁring. Therefore, it has been argued that the distinction between quits and layoﬀs
is unclear. However, vacancies in coach positions are rare during the season, and
a coach who anticipates being ﬁred is extremely unlikely to be able to generate
an outside oﬀer. There exists a ‘class’ structure for coaches in the Dutch premier
league. That is, a coach who either quits or gets ﬁred from one team in the premier
league usually ﬁnds another position in the same league. This makes the pool of
potential employers of a coach (who anticipates being ﬁred) limited. Hence, outside
oﬀers can only be generated if another team has a vacancy or just ﬁred a coach,
and that is a rare coincidence.
A ﬁrst sketch of the number of coaches ﬁred and their eﬀects is given in table 1.
If one keeps in mind that only 18 teams participate in the premier league, it is clear
from the second column of table 1 that coach dismissals are not uncommon.
Note that in soccer, a game won yields three points, a draw one point, and a loss
zero points. The number of points determines the ranking. The column labeled
AGP contains the average number of points per game for the old and new coach
(we average over teams that change coaches). We see that on average the new coach
earns more points with his team. Moreover, we see that in most seasons the average
number of goals per game increases (N¯), and that the number of goals conceded (M¯)
decreases on average. Based on this eyeball interpretation of the data, one would
conclude that ﬁring the coach of an underperforming team is a sensible strategy as
results then improve.
This conclusion, however, may not be correct. The old coach and the new coach
do not play the same opponents. Coaches are not ﬁred randomly throughout the
season, but usually after a spell of disappointing results. There can be two expla-
nations for these losses: the team is underperforming or suﬀers from bad luck (in
other circumstances the team could have won some of these games), or the other
teams are simply better. Since the schedule of the competition is ﬁxed, it is possible
that the old coach started the season by playing tough opponents. If he gets ﬁred
and a new coach takes over, the new coach faces the lesser teams in the competi-
tion, and wins his games. It is diﬃcult to attribute the improvement in results to
changes in the coach as there are quality diﬀerences among teams and the order
of play is non-random. Hence, any precise measurement of the coach eﬀect should
allow for randomness of results, and for quality diﬀerences among the opponents
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of the team. This is the subject of the next section.
4 The Effect of Firing a Coach
As argued in the previous section, it is not satisfactory to compare the average
number of points gained (or other measures of team performance like the number
of goals scored or the percentage of games won) by the old coach with the average
number of points gained by the new coach. In this section, we will use two diﬀerent
approaches to correct for this potential bias. First, we estimate a model that ranks
teams and second, we estimate a model for the number of goals scored in home
and away games. In both models we examine whether the presence of a ﬁring eﬀect
can be detected. In both models the explanatory variables include the quality of the
opposing team and therefore these models correct for any bias introduced by the
non-random schedule of play.
First, we characterize teams by two parameters: the quality of the team and
the home advantage of the team. We will test whether these parameters change
after the coach is ﬁred. Diﬀerent methods have been proposed to measure such
quality, see among others Stefani (1980), Clarke and Norman (1995), Kuk (1995),
and Koning (2000). The model used here is similar to that of Stefani, and Clarke
and Norman.
Consider a game between two teams indexed i and j. In what follows, the team
indexed i will be the team that plays a home game while team indexed j (the op-
ponent of team i) is the away team1. The number of goals scored by team i against
team j is denoted by Nij, and the number of goals conceded by the home team is
Mij . The goal diﬀerence is deﬁned as Dij = Nij −Mij . The quality of team i is de-
noted by θi, and the goal diﬀerence is related to the diﬀerence of quality between
both teams. The goal diﬀerence Dij is assumed to have the following form:
Dij = hi + θi − θj + ij (1)
where hi a parameter that denotes home advantage. The term hi may be inter-
preted as the expected win margin if team i would play a home game against a
team of equal quality (that is, if θi − θj = 0). ij is a mean zero error term that has
constant variance. If Dij is positive, we expect team i to win, if it is negative, we
1Home advantage is strong in soccer: approximately 50% of all games in the history of Dutch soccer
are won by the home team, 25% are won by the away team, and 25% end in a draw, see Koning (2000).
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expect team j to win. In model (1) team i can win against team j even if it is of
inferior quality (θi − θj < 0) if the home advantage of team i is big enough. Note
that not all parameters in equation (1) are identiﬁed, so we impose the identifying
restriction
∑
i θi = 0: the quality parameters can be interpreted as deviations from
a hypothetical average team with quality 0. The home advantage hi is allowed to
vary between teams; in the empirical results we ﬁnd that the restriction of constant
(over teams) home advantage is rejected.
It is now straightforward to measure the eﬀect of a change of coach in model (1):
we allow both the parameters that captures the home advantage and the quality
parameter θi to vary. We estimate the following two extensions to model (1) for
those teams that ﬁre a coach during the season:
hni = hoi + ki, i ∈ F (2)
θni = θoi +ψi, i ∈ F , (3)
with the superscript referring to either the new coach (n) or the old coach (o) and
F is the set of teams that ﬁred a coach during the season. ki measures the change
in home advantage and ψi measures the change in team quality. Besides testing
whether the ki’s andψi diﬀer jointly from 0, we also test whether they are constant
over teams that ﬁre their coach : ki = k and ψi = ψ for all i.
The extensions (2) and (3) makes a ﬁring eﬀect, if any, easily interpretable. Let
team i face an opponent of equal quality in a home game so that θoi − θj = 0.
Under the old coach, the expected goal diﬀerence is hoi , under the new coach it is
hoi + ki +ψi, a change of ki +ψi. Should this game be played away, the expected
change of goal diﬀerence is ψi. Hence, if there is a positive ﬁring eﬀect we would
expect both ψi > 0 and ki > 0.
Summaries of the results of the estimation of model (1) with extensions (2)
and (3) are given in table 2. More detailed information on the estimation results by
teams that changed coaches can be found in Appendix B. Because of the large num-
ber of parameters that are estimated for each model2, we only give some summary
statistics in table 2: the second column contains the R2 of the basic model (1), the
third column extends that model by allowing for changing home advantage (equa-
tion (2)), the fourth column (labeled ψi) allows for changing quality (equation (3)),
the ﬁfth column (labeled ki,ψi) allows for both changing home advantage and team
2The number of parameters that is estimated varies between 35 (basic model) and 51 (1995/96
season, unrestricted model).
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quality. Finally, in column six (labeled k) we impose the constraint that the change
in home advantage is equal for all teams (ki = k), and in column seven we impose a
ﬁxed change in team quality (ψi = ψ). In the last column we give estimation results
where we assume that the changes in home advantage and team quality are similar
accross teams that changed the coach (ki = k and ψi = ψ for all i ∈ F ). The point
estimates for k and ψ are also given where applicable.
The picture that emerges from table 2 is rather mixed. The results for the
1993/94 season indicate that there is a signiﬁcant coach-eﬀect, that is, perfor-
mance improves after a coach is ﬁred. The detailed results in table 5 show that
for all teams that changed coach, both the quality improved (ψi > 0) and the home
advantage improved (ki > 0). These results are in line with those documented by
Van Dalen.
This remarkable result, however, is speciﬁc to the 1993/94 season and we do not
ﬁnd such strong results for later seasons. For all seasons we tested the restriction
whether the change of home advantage and the change of quality is constant among
teams that ﬁred a coach (that is, whether ki = k and ψi = ψ for all teams that
change a coach). It is only for the 1994/95 season that this restriction is rejected
with a p-value of 0.041, so we restrict our attention to the estimation results in
the last column of table 2. As concluded above, it is only for the 1993/94 season
that we ﬁnd the result that the change of coach signiﬁcantly improves both home
advantage and team quality. For the 1996/97 season we ﬁnd that home advantage
changes signiﬁcantly, but the change of team quality is insigniﬁcant and negative.
The other seasons do not show any signiﬁcant improvements in home advantage
and team quality. The ﬁnding that a coach change may or may not improve home
advantage and/or team quality is corroborated by the detailed regression results
listed in Appendix B: team quality decreases for 11 out of 28 changes and home
advantage decreases 10 times.
These conclusions are at odds with the ones based on the descriptive statis-
tics in section 3. There, the average goal diﬀerence improves when a new coach is
appointed, except for the 1995/96 season. When quality diﬀerences among oppo-
nents is corrected for, the coach eﬀect disappears. The conclusions based on the
descriptive statistics in table 1 are based on sample selectivity.
It could be argued that a ﬁring eﬀect, if any, is only temporary. We tested for a
temporary succession eﬀect by letting the dummy variable that indicates the new
coach take value 1 for his ﬁrst two or four games, and 0 after those games. This
9
h, θ ki ψi ki, ψi k ψ k, ψ
1993/94
R2 0.312 0.337∗ 0.342∗ 0.349 0.328∗ 0.335∗ 0.336∗
k - - - - 1.538∗ - 1.261
ψ - - - - - 0.977∗ 0.343
1994/95
R2 0.373 0.392 0.419 0.423 0.373 0.377 0.377
k - - - - 0.089 - −0.312
ψ - - - - - 0.410 0.571
1995/96
R2 0.484 0.503 0.482 0.506 0.484 0.485 0.485
k - - - - −0.185 - −0.081
ψ - - - - - −0.175 −0.139
1996/97
R2 0.367 0.378 0.371 0.397 0.378∗ 0.367 0.380∗
k - - - - 1.000∗ - 1.386∗
ψ - - - - - 0.272 −0.423
1997/98
R2 0.465 0.484 0.496∗ 0.496 0.468 0.476∗ 0.476
k - - - - 0.600 - −0.157
ψ - - - - - 0.851∗ 0.932
Table 2: Summary of estimation results ranking model, ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at
5%-level with the null model the model of the second column.
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temporary coach eﬀect turned out to be insigniﬁcant in almost all seasons. For the
1995/96 season we ﬁnd that the team under the new coach performs signiﬁcantly
worse during the ﬁrst two games! In that season, there is no signiﬁcant coach eﬀect
during the ﬁrst four weeks. According to these results, a temporary improvement
in results can not be found.
In the model used above, there is no distinction between goals scored and goals
conceded: the dependent variable is the goal diﬀerence. According to popular be-
lief, new coaches try to improve the defense so that any losing streak is ended. It
is possible that such an extra defensive eﬀort reduces the oﬀensive eﬀorts of the
team. In this case we may not observe any change of goal diﬀerence as the decrease
in goals conceded is oﬀset by a decrease of goals scored. Therefore, it is of interest
to analyze the number of goals scored and conceded separately, and see if they are
inﬂuenced by a change of coaches during the season.
To answer this question, we use a variant of the Poisson model for soccer scores
developed by Maher (1982). We assume that Nij (the number of goals scored by
team i against team j in a home game) follows a Poisson distribution with param-
eter λij . This parameter will be referred to as the scoring intensity. We assume
that
λij = αiβj, (4)
where αi measures the oﬀensive skills of team i. The parameter βj captures the
defensive skills of team j. Our statistical model for the number of home goals
is Nij ∼ P(λij). Again, not all parameters αi, i = 1, . . . , I and βj, j = 1, . . . , I are
identiﬁed. We impose the identifying restriction
∑I
j=1 βj = I. The expected number
of goals of team i if it would play against the defense of every team in the league








because of the normalization mentioned above. Hence, we can interpret αi as the
expected number of goals team i would score if the identity of the opponent is
unknown. We assume a similar model for Mij (the number of goals conceded by
team i when it plays a home game against team j). Mij is also assumed to follow a
Poisson distribution with parameter µij , and




i=1 δi = I. We assume that Nij and Mij are uncorrelated. In
fact, the correlation over the 1993/94-1997/98 period is slightly negative −0.19,
but the analysis is simpliﬁed tremendously when we make the zero correlation
assumption.
The approach to measuring whether a new coach has better results in terms
of goals scored and goals conceded is similar to the approach taken in the rating
model discussed earlier. First, we estimate a model for scoring intensities both in
home and away games, and then examine whether these intensities have changed
under the new coach.
In the interest of ﬁtting a pasimonious model, we estimated αi, βi, γi, and δi
without any restrictions, and then we tested whether any restrictions could be im-
posed. The only restriction we could not reject for all seasons at the 5%-level of
signiﬁcance was αi = kγi: the average oﬀensive capabilities of a team in an away
game are proportional to its average oﬀensive capabilities in a home game. The
parameter k can be interpreted as a measure of home advantage, as it is the ratio
of the expected number of goals in a home game to the expected number of goals
in an away game. According to the restriction αi = kγi, this ratio is the same for
each team. Of course, we found k > 1 for all seasons. Defensive capabilities vary
between teams between home and away games: some teams defend better at home
and some defend better in an away game.
Using the speciﬁcation λij = αiβj and µij = kαiδj , we tested whether oﬀen-
sive and defensive capabilities vary between the old coach and the new coach by
allowing the parameters αi, βi, and δi to vary between the old coach and the new
coach:
αni = αoi ·φi, i ∈ F
βni = βoi · ζi, i ∈ F
δni = δoi · ξi, i ∈ F .
F is the set of teams that ﬁred a coach. The estimation results are summarized in
table 3 in the second column (labeled φi, ζi, ξi). In this column, the p-values are
reported that correspond to the hypothesis φi = ζi = ξi = 1 for all teams that ﬁred
their coach. This is the null-hypothesis of no coach eﬀect: the new coach is not able
to improve either the oﬀensive skills or defensive skills of the team. We see that
the that ﬁring a coach has no eﬀect is rejected marginally for the 1994/95 season
and not rejected for any other season.
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φi, ζi, ξi φ, ζ
p-value p-value φ ζ
1993/94 0.17 0.0033 1.39 0.65∗
1994/95 0.046∗ 0.25 1.24 0.96
1995/96 0.15 0.052 0.79 0.89
1996/97 0.24 0.28 1.19 0.82
1997/98 0.089 0.033 1.15 0.69∗
Table 3: p-value’s Poisson models, ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 5%-level.
We also examined whether any ﬁring eﬀect is present in this model by esti-
mating a slightly more restricted alternative model. In this model, we tested again
whether oﬀensive and defensive capabilities have changed, but now we assume
that the eﬀects (if any) are constant across teams:
αni = αoi ·φ, i ∈ F
βni = βoi · ζ, i ∈ F
δni = δoi · ζ, i ∈ F .
The restrictions φi = φ, ζi = ξi = ζ could not be rejected for any season at the
usual 5%-level. The p-values for testing the hypothesis φ = ζ = 1 are reported in
table 3 in the column labeled φ, ζ. The estimates for φ and ζ are presented in
the last two columns of table 3. In this speciﬁcation, the expected number of goals
scored by team i when it plays a home game against team j is αiβj under the old
coach and φαiβj under the new coach. Therefore, there would be any ﬁring eﬀect,
we would expect φ to exceed 1 (oﬀensive capabilities improve). Similar reasoning
leads us to believe that ζ is smaller than 1 (defensive capabilities improve). We see
that the hypothesis of no ﬁring eﬀect is now rejected for two seasons: 1993/94 and
1997/98. In both cases, the rejection is caused by a signiﬁcant improvement in the
defensive capabilities of the teams that ﬁred a coach: the expected number of goals
conceded is reduced by 35% and 31% respectively. Note that these improvements
in defensive skills correspond to a drop in the average number of goals conceded
by 0.65 (1993/94) and 0.78 (1997/98) (see table 1). In the rating model discussed
earlier, we also found that in these two seasons team quality improved signiﬁcantly.
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5 Conclusions
This paper examines if ﬁring a coach and hiring a new one improves the perfor-
mance of a team. We focus on soccer and in particular soccer in the Dutch Pre-
mier League. Our results illustrate tht it is not suﬃcient to simply compare goals
scored, or some measure of goals scored under the old and new coach. This simple
approach does not control for the diﬀerences in the quality of the opponents faced
by the new and old coach.
Our methodology uses data from a ﬁve year period and controls for quality
diﬀerences in opponents. We ﬁnd that the performance of a team does not always
improve when a coach is ﬁred. In some cases, new coaches perform worse than
their ﬁred predecessors. This result is contrary to previous ﬁndings in the sports
literature which indicate that ﬁring a coach improves performance.
The model used in this paper allows us separate changes in performance to
changes in defensive and oﬀensive skills. By doing so, we ﬁnd that there is some
evidence that the defensive skills of the teams show improvement when a coach is
ﬁred and a new coach takes over. This may indicate however, that the new coach
adopts a strategy to avoid losses rather than a more aggressive winning strategy.
Considering our empirical results, ﬁring a coach occurs too often. Since it is not
clear that the results on the ﬁeld improve after a change of coach, it is likely that
the board of a team intervenes for other reasons. It is likely that fan and media
pressure are also strong determinants of the tenure of a coach.
It would be interesting to address the question whether a new coach is more
successful if he is an outsider than if he is an insider. Unfortunately, our data do
not allow us to address this issue, we leave this for future research.
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A Fired Coaches 1993/94 until 1997/98
A complete overview of coaches that were ﬁred during the period we consider is
given in table 4. In the ﬁrst column we give the team, in the second column the
coach that was ﬁred, in the third column the reason for the ﬁring, and in the ﬁfth
and sixth column the new coach and the date respectively. We distinguish between
four diﬀerent reasons for a termination of the contract between the coach and his
team:
results The coach is ﬁred because the results fall short of expectations.
oﬀer The coach leaves because he has a better oﬀer from another team.
relation The coach is ﬁred because work relation between either the coach and the
team or the coach and the board have become strained.
voluntary The coach leaves his job voluntarily.
When a coach is ﬁred, a settlement has to be made between the team and the
coach. Whenever is possible to reach such a settlement before the actual date of
ﬁring, the dismissal is listed as ‘voluntary’.
Sometimes the vacancy is ﬁlled by an interim coach ﬁrst. In that case both the
interim coach and the new coach are listed, as for example in the case of Volendam
(1993/94): Korbach was succeeded by the interim coach Steegman on 2 Nov 1993,
and the interim coach was succeeded by the new head coach Rijsbergen on 27 Feb
1994.
Note that in 1995/96 the coach of Volendam was ﬁred after the regular com-
petition. The team played promotion/relegation games under the new coach. Since
we focus on results during the regular competition only, we do not take this ﬁring
into account in the empirical results.
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Team Fired coach Reason New Coach Date
1993/94
FC Utrecht Faﬁe´ results Van Veen 17 Sep 1993
Cambuur De Jong results Korbach 2 Nov 1993
Volendam Korbach oﬀer Steegman 2 Nov 1993
Rijsbergen 27 Feb 1994
RKC Verel results Jacobs 16 Dec 1993
FC Groningen Vonk results Koevermans 19 Mar 1994
1994/95
PSV De Mos relation Rijvers 29 Oct 1994
Advocaat 15 Dec 1994
Go Ahead Eagles Ten Cate results Faﬁe´ 30 Jan 1995
FC Utrecht Van Veen results Vonk/
Du Chatinier 18 Feb 1995
Dordrecht ’90 Van Zoghel results Verslijen 4 Mar 1995
Sparta Berger relation Van Stee 21 Mar 1995
Willem II Reker relation De Jong 26 Mar 1995
MVV Vergoossen voluntary Reker 16 May 1995
1995/96
Feyenoord Van Hanegem results Meijer 2 Oct 1995
Haan 16 Oct 1995
De Graafschap Ko¨rver relation Korbach 31 Oct 1995
NEC Van Kooten results Looyen 7 Nov 1995
Koevermans 8 Dec 1995
Vitesse Spelbos results Thijssen/
Jongbloed 20 Nov 1995
FC Twente Ten Donkelaar voluntary Rutten 20 Nov 1995
Meyer 15 Jan 1996
FC Utrecht Kistemaker results De Ruiter 18 Dec 1995
Spelbos 18 Jan 1996
Table 4: Fired coaches, source Voetbal International (1999)(continued).
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Team Fired coach Reason New Coach Date
Willem II De Jong relation Calderwood 19 Mar 1996
Go Ahead Eagles Faﬁe´ results Maaskant/
Maaskant 16 Apr 1996
FC Volendam Jacobs results Brouwer/
De Boer 6 May 1996
1996/97
Roda JC Stevens oﬀer Achterberg 10 Oct 1996
Jol 1 Nov 1996
RKC Van Kooten results Verkerk 12 Oct 1996
Jacobs
Sparta Ten Cate oﬀer Brand 12 Jan 1997
Roks/
Van Tiggelen 17 Apr 1997
Vitesse Beenhakker voluntary Ten Cate 10 Jan 1997
FC Groningen Westerhof results Van Dijk 25 Feb 1997
NEC Koevermans results Looyen 3 Mar 1997
1997/98
Fortuna S. Verbeek voluntary Van Marwijk 3 Sep 1997
FC Utrecht Spelbos results De Ruiter 27 Oct 1997
Wotte 4 Jan 1998
Feyenoord Haan results Meijer 28 Oct 1997
Beenhakker 7 Nov 1997
Roda JC Jol results Achterberg 6 Mar 1998
Vonk 17 Mar 1998
FC Groningen Rijsbergen results Van Dijk 31 Mar 1998










Cambuur −0.966 −0.933 - −0.411 1.265 -
Groningen −0.496 0.391 0.365 −0.540 0.885 0.895
RKC −0.510 0.329 −0.074 −0.380 0.364 1.035
Utrecht −1.369 −0.671 0.322 0.945 1.139 0.785
1994/95
Dordrecht −0.938 0.616 −0.624 0.458 0.246 0.062
Go Ahead Eagles −1.639 0.192 −0.356 −0.540 0.885 0.573
MVV −0.834 0.511 0.304 0.596 0.107 0.016
PSV 1.160 0.740 1.432 0.804 1.550 0.703
Sparta −0.698 −1.525 −0.303 1.711 2.036 0.938
Utrecht −0.902 0.722 0.131 1.361 −0.760 0.625
Willem II 0.253 −2.097 0.020 0.849 1.674 1.109
Table 5: Detailed results for the regression model (continued).
B Detailed Estimation Results
In this appendix we give detailed estimation results of the models in section 4. First,
in table 5 we give the name of the teams that changed coaches, with the quality and
home parameters of the old and new coaches. Moreover, we give the quality and
home parameters of these teams based on estimation of the model for the four











Feyenoord −0.436 1.246 1.359 3.601 −0.013 0.040
Go Ahead Eagles 0.256 −1.452 −0.466 −1.235 −0.271 0.527
De Graafschap −0.612 −1.564 −1.162 −0.051 2.578 1.519
NEC −0.458 −0.246 −0.330 −0.881 −1.037 1.107
FC Twente 0.300 0.030 0.545 −0.632 0.078 0.697
Utrecht −0.858 −0.208 −0.043 0.139 −0.273 0.525
Vitesse 0.219 0.842 0.855 0.542 −0.489 0.369
Willem II 0.616 −0.852 −0.267 0.311 −0.459 0.900
1996/97
Groningen −0.426 1.806 −0.155 −0.137 −1.760 0.437
NEC −0.838 −1.346 −0.213 0.412 2.489 −0.103
RKC 0.247 −0.926 0.371 −0.928 0.961 −0.282
Vitesse 0.674 −0.799 0.785 −0.416 2.249 0.265
1997/98
Feyenoord −0.030 1.252 1.936 −0.168
Fortuna Sittard −2.130 0.863 −0.765 −0.227
Groningen −0.650 −0.885 0.934 1.521
Roda JC 0.312 0.553 0.058 0.256
Utrecht −1.121 0.263 0.581 1.064
Table 5: Detailed results for the regression model.
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